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Louisiana Recent Developments 
Gary H. Love 
Blanchard,Waler, O'Quin & Roberts, A P.L.C. 
Shreveport,Louisiana 
I. Cases 
A. Community Property 
Harvey 
v. 
Amoco Production Co., 
No. 96-1714 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/20/97); 696 So. 2d 672. 
This case concerned a disputed mineral lease entered into by plaintiff 
in 1977. The mineral lease affected property purchased by the plaintiff and 
nine relatives from plaintiffs uncle, the deed reciting that the purchasers 
were acquiring with separate and paraphernal funds under separate 
management and control and for their separate estates. Plaintiff 
s
husband 
did not sign the deed acknowledging plaintiff 
s 
declaration. Plaintiff and 
her husband subsequently divorced. Both plaintiff and her former husband 
executed leases affecting the property. At issue in this litigation was 
whether the property was community property or the separate property of 
the plaintiff. Because the husband did notjoin in the deed, the presumption 
that the property was community was not rebutted conclusively by the 
presence of the Adouble declaration.@ The court of appeal affirmed the 
jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff carried her 
burden of overcoming the presumption of community by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
B. Dedication of Streets 
State of Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development 
v. Scramuzza, No. 96-1796 (La. 4/8/97); 692 So. 2d 1024. 
In 1988, the State expropriated land through a number of subdivisions 
which were platted and recorded, but never developed. The subdivision 
streets were statutorily dedicated to St. Charles Parish. The streets were 
never built and the property owners of the expropriated land, defendants 
in 
the expropriation suit proceedings, asserted that the land dedicated to the 
parish for subdivision streets had been abandoned and reverted back to the 
landowners. Supreme court holds that statutorily dedicated streets do not 
revert to the adjoining landowners upon mere abandonment by the parish 
and that a formal act of revocation by the parish is necessary to revoke 
a 
statutory dedication of streets under La. R.S. 48:701. La. R.S. 48:701 
provides that the appropriate governing authorities may record and set aside 
the dedication of roads and streets that have been abandoned or are no 
longer needed. 
Cantrelle v. Gaude, 
97-20 (La. App. 5th Cir. 7/29/97); 700 So. 2d 523. 
Landowners brought suit to establish ownership of alleyway between 
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their property and the property of their neighbors. The alleyway had 
previously been dedicated as a public roadway. The road was never 
constructed and the Parish executed an ordinance which closed this 
dedicated roadway and indicated it was not longer needed for a public 
purpose. This satisfied the requirements of a formal revocation of a 
statutorily dedicated roadway and failure to record the ordinance did not 
render it invalid. Court found that plaintiffs acquired the entire alleyway 
through ten-year acquisitive prescription but that the defendant neighbors 
were entitled to a predial servitude ofpassage to the entire alleyway. 
Cavaness v. Norton, 
No. 96-1411 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/9/97); 694 So. 2d 1174. 
Suit regarding whether a subdivision street was statutorily or impliedly 
dedicated for public use. The owner of the property recorded a subdivision 
plat showing numerous named streets and block and lot numbers. The plat 
did not contain a street dedication clause. A subsequent revised plat stated 
that the disputed road was dedicated to the public as a right of way only. 
The court ofappeal holds that the plat initially filed substantially complied 
with La. R.S. 33:5051 and that the surrounding circumstances reflected an 
intent to dedicate. The court concluded that the disputed property was 
statutorily dedicated to public use and that ownership of the road vested 
in 
the public. 
C. Gas Purchase Contracts 
Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp. v. Walsh Brothers - Gahagan, Ltd, 
No. 96-1295 (La. App. 3d Cir. 3/12/9 7); 692 So. 2d 1177. 
Continued litigation regarding the interpretation of pricing provisions 
in a natural gas sales contract between LIG and Walsh Brothers. In this 
iteration, the court of appeal reversed the decision of the trial court and 
remanded the case again for trial of the issue ofwhether the parties intended 
that the NGPA Section 103 pricing formula control even after Section 103 
was repealed. 
D. Immovables 
Bayou Fleet Partnership v. Dra o Basic Materials Co., 
106 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 1997). 
Defendant was the lessee of an aggregate yard from which it stored and 
sold limestone. The defendant built three stockpiles of loose limestone, 
each with a foundation made from hardened limestone known as a working 
base. The question in the suit was whether the defendant was entitled to 
remove the limestone working bases and the stockpile limestone from the 
property, or whether it was owned by a creditor of the landowner who had 
seized the land and acquired it at a judicial sale. 
Court holds that because of their size, degree of attachment, and 
permanence, massive limestone working bases established by lessee were 
"other constructions permanently attached to the ground" and therefore 
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classified as immovable under Louisiana Civil Code Article 463. The loose 
stockpiles were not immovables. The court held that the lessee did not 
overcome the presumption that the owner of the land was the owner of the 
"other constructions permanently attached to the ground," because the 
lessee failed to evidence its separate ownership of the construction by filing 
an appropriate instrument in the public records. 
E. Lesion 
Cook v. Mixon, 
No. 29491 (La. App. 2d Cir. 8/22/97); 700 So. 2d 1264, Rehearing 
denied. 
Plaintiffs sold 160 acre tract of timberland to defendants in September,
1994 for $84,215. Six weeks later, the defendants received a bid from 
Willamette Industries to buy the property for $192,180. Willamette 
subsequently raised its bid and the defendants sold the property to 
Willamette in January, 1995 for $225,934. Plaintiff brought an action 
against defendants under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2594 to recover the 
profit the defendants realized from the sale. The trial court held that lesion 
applied and ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The court of appeal reversed, 
holding that even through the sale to Willamette was for over two and one-
half times the price received by the plaintiff,the plaintiff nevertheless failed 
to carry her burden ofproving that the price was less than one-half of the 
fair market value of the immovable sold. In reaching its conclusion, the 
court of appeal noted that the trial court placed too much emphasis on the 
Willamette transaction, and not having such transaction excluded from the 
Amarket@ analysis. The court of appeal said this approach ignored the 
Afair value@ and that for our law to provide relief under the policy for 
lesion in a setting closely akin to the sale ofmovable property (for which no 
lesionary remedy exists) which can be counted and priced to determine fair 
market value, the plaintiff was required to establish that Willamette's bid 
was accurate. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to do that and that 
Willamette's appraisal and purchase were not indicative of the fair market 
value of the property. 
Hart v. Jack Mims, Inc., 
No. 29734 (La. App. 2d Cir. 8/20/97); 698 So. 2d 742. 
Plaintiffs filed a suit to rescind a sale of immovable on grounds 
of 
lesion. The sale occurred on November 27, 1991 and suit was filed on 
November 27, 1995. At the time of the sale, Louisiana Civil Code Article 
2595 provided for a four year prescriptive period for an action for lesion. 
Article 2595 was amended in 1993 to provide for a one year peremptive 
period. The court ofappeal held that the legislature expressly provided that 
the provisions ofAct 841 of 1993, including the peremption provision, were 
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F. Partition 
Connally v. Nevils, 
No. 97-569 (La. App. 3d Cir. 10/29/97); 702 So. 2d 1043. 
Co-owners of property brought action against the remaining owner 
seeking a partition in kind of approximately 80 acres of land. The parties 
stipulated that the property was capable of being divided in kind without 
loss of value or inconvenience to the parties. At trial, each party proposed 
different divisions of the land. The trial court initially adopted the 
defendant's proposal, but on a motion for new trial, adopted the plaintiffs' 
proposal. The defendant appealed. The court of appeal held that the trial 
court erred in failing to have experts divide the property into lots of equal 
value which would then be drawn by chance by the parties. 
Ivanhoe 
Canal Corp. v. Bunn, 
No. 95-0143 (La.App. 1st Cir. 10/6/97); 694 So. 2d 263. 
Co-owner brought suit for partition by licitation. Texaco, one of the 
defendant co-owners, contended that property could not be partitioned 
because of the provisions of Louisiana Civil Code Article 808 which 
provide that property is excluded from partition when its use 
is 
indispensable for the enjoyment of another thing owned by one or more of 
the co-owners. The court ofappeal held that a canal located on the property 
sought to be partitioned and used by Texaco in connection with its lease of 
other property, located adjacent to the property sought to be partitioned, 
was excluded from partition because the canal was indispensable for the 
enjoyment of Texaco's lease. The canal went through the property sought 
to be partitioned and gave Texaco access to other waterways where it had 
oil and gas exploration and production activities. The court of appeal found 
that Texaco's lease of the adjacent property was an incorporeal immovable 





No. 97-0239 (La. 10/21/97); 701 So. 2d 1291. 
Plaintiff brought a legal malpractice action more than three years after 
the date of the alleged negligent act. The Louisiana Supreme Court holds 
that in enacting La. R.S. 9:5605, the peremptive period for actions in legal 
malpractice, the legislature intended that three years after the "act, omission, 
or neglect," the cause of action is extinguished, regardless of when the 
negligence is discovered and regardless of whether a malpractice action 
may be brought within that three-year period. The court of appeal had 
found that while the attorney-client relationship is in existence and the 
attorney is actively attempting to remedy the alleged malpractice, until the 
judgment 
giving rise to the malpractice claim becomes definitive, a legal 
malpractice claim does not ripen into a cause ofaction. The Supreme Court 
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prescriptive period and thus the "continuous representation rule" was 
erroneously applied by the court of appeal. 
H. Possession / Acquisitive Prescription 
Bennett v. Louisiana Pacific Corporation, 
No. 29,598 (La.App. 2d Cir.5/9/97); 693 So. 2d 1319, writ denied. 
Plaintiff brought an action seeking damages for the wrongful cutting of 
timber. The facts showed that plaintiff and defendant owned contiguous 
tracts of land with both deeds describing the property as running from the 
mouth of Cut-off Bayou to the center of the Section. The location of Cut-
off Bayou was disputed. The court of appeal held that plaintiff acquired 
ownership of the disputed lands by thirty year acquisitive prescription. The 
disputed land had been fenced in 1939 and plaintiff's ancestors in title had 
possessed to the fence for more than thirty years without interruption. 
Falcone v. 
Springview Country Club, Inc., 
No. 96-0794 (La.App. 1st Cir.3/2 797); 691 So. 2d 314. 
Plaintiffs brought a petitory action on November 3, 1993 against 
defendant claiming ownership of land upon which a golf course was 
constructed. The record reflected that Nicholl Spring acquired a 76 acre 
tract of land on July 10, 1948. On October 31, 1961, Nicholl Spring leased 
a 56 acre parcel to the defendant, and on April 10, 1964, Spring sold the 
parcel to the defendant. Both Spring and defendant apparently possessed, 
within fenced boundaries, lands other than those described in their title. 
The trial court held that the defendant established title under both ten and 
thirty year acquisitive prescription. The court ofappeal affirmed, but held 
that the trial court erred in holding that the defendant established title by ten 
year acquisitive prescription because the parcel in question was not 
sufficiently described and therefore the element of just title was not 
established. The court of appeal held that the defendant established title 
by 
thirty year acquisitive prescription because the defendant, pursuant to 
Louisiana Civil Code Article 794, was entitled to tack its predecessor's 
possession, notwithstanding the failure of the 1964 deed to describe the 
disputed parcel. Even though defendant's 1964 deed did not sufficiently 
describe parcel in question for purposes of ten year prescription, it was 
a 
sufficient juridical link to permit tacking. 
CrowellLand & Mineral Corp. v. Funderburk, 
No. 96-1123 (La. App. 3d Cir.3/5/79); 692 So. 2d 535. Writ not 
considered 
In October 1990, Crowell brought suit to be recognized as owner of 
certain property possessed by the defendants. Prudum Edwards bought 
certain lands in the 1930's and fenced the property purchased, together with 
five and one-half acres of an adjoining tract not included in the purchase. 
These five and one-half acres were the subject of the dispute. Edwards 
maintained the fence and used the land as pasture until 1950. From 1950 
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until 1961, Edwards did not use the property or maintain the fence. In 
1961, Edwards allowed the defendants to put a camper trailer on the 
disputed property and the defendants repaired the fence and pastured cattle. 
The trial court held that the defendants acquired the disputed tract through 
thirty years acquisitive prescription, tacking defendant's possession to that 
of Edwards. The court of appeal reversed, holding that there was an 
interruption of possession during the period 1950 to 1961 and that the 
presumption of continuous possession under Louisiana Civil Code Article 
3443 had been rebutted. Accordingly, the defendants were unable to show 




No. 28,971 (La.App. 2d Cir. 12/11/96); 685 So. 2d 450. 
Plaintiff
and defendant are owners of adjoining lots on Lake Claiborne. 
In 1993, Atwood rebuilt and expanded a boathouse which extended over 
the extended property line. In 1992, Hylan built a pier twelve feet from the 
property line, but at one point only four feet from Atwood's structure. The 
court of appeal held that Atwood constructed his pier in good faith and was 
entitled to a servitude under Louisiana Civil Code Article 670 and reversed 
the trial court's order that Atwood remove part of his pier. The case was 
remanded for a determination of the consideration to be paid for the 
servitude. 




No. 96-1155 (La.App. 3d Cir.3/5/97); 692 So. 2d 521. 
In 1983, plaintiff filed a notice of privilege under the Private Works 
Act for labor and materials supplied to a work site and filed suit naming 
Greener 
& 
Sumner, a trade name of the actual owner of the property, as 
defendant. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the lien was 
recognized. Subsequently, the present suit was filed against the surety for 
the property owner. The surety contended that because the 
plaintiff 
failed 
to properly name the owner in the previous suit, the 
plaintiff 
failed to 
interrupt the one year prescriptive period established by La. R.S. 9:4823. 
The court of appeal held that while the prior suit did not provide third 
parties notice because the suit did not correctly name the owner, the surety 
was not a third party and the prior suit properly resulted in a judgment 
against the owner of the property. 
Cable 
& 
Connector Warehouse, Inc. v. Omnimark, Inc., 
No. 96-2831 (La.App. 4th Cir.9/12/9 7); 700 So. 2d 1273. 
This case involves a suit by an unpaid supplier of a supplier for 
materials ultimately used in a construction project. The action was 
commenced under the Private Works Act. The unpaid supplier sold cable to 
Omnimark, Inc. who then sold the cable to the cable installer subcontractor, 
Sandoz Group, Inc. The prime contractor paid Sandoz, but Sandoz did not 
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pay Omnimark and Omnimark did not pay the plaintiff. Sandoz and 
Omnimark were owned by the same individual. The court of appeal 
affirmed the trial court's grant ofa summary judgment on the ground that a 
supplier to a supplier has no rights under the Private Works Act. 
J. Royalty Issues 
Babin v. First Energy Corp., 
No. 96-1232 (La.App. 1st Cir.3/27/97); 693 So. 2d 813. 
Plaintiffs are 131 royalty and overriding royalty owners who brought 
suit for underpayment of royalties. The defendants had constructed gas 
processing facilities at a cost of $9.7 million and charged non-royalty 
owners $0.35 to $0.60 per MMBtu to process gas. According to the 
plaintiffs, actual gas processing costs ranged from $0.08 to $0.17 per 
MMBtu, but defendants deducted $0.20 to $0.25 per MMBtu in calculating 
royalty and overriding royalty payments. The trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor ofdefendants, holding that the defendants could charge 
the "fair market value" of the processing services. The court of appeal 
reversed, holding that the lessee may deduct for reasonable costs, but not 
additional amounts for profit. According to the court of appeal, in cost 
accounting terms, deduction for the fair market value of the processing is a 
charge for profit. 
Lewis v. Texaco Exploration Prot Co., 
No. 96-1458 (La.App. 1st Cir. 7/30/97); 698 So. 2d 1001. 
Plaintiffs are mineral lessors and royalty owners who sought to bring a 
class action for an accounting and royalties on take-or-pay settlements. The 
court of appeal affirms trial court's certification of the class. The court of 
appeal also holds that a letter written by five royalty owners, purportedly on 
behalf of themselves and the entire class, was sufficient to constitute notice 
to Texaco for the entire class under Article 137 of the Mineral Code. 
Louisiana Land & Exploration Company v. Unocal Corp , 
93-1540, (E.D. La. 12/5/97); WL 756597 (Not reportedin Federal 
Supplements). 
Plaintiff sued for withheld extraction charges and gathering payments 
collected by defendant, and royalties not collected by defendant as a result 
ofa settlement reached by defendant with a gas purchaser concerning a take 
or pay claim. The plaintiff and defendant were parties to a joint operating 
agreement. LL&E sought a percentage of the proceeds paid to the 
processor for condensate produced from the leases in question. The 
processor was allowed to keep 25% of condensate extracted from gas 
produced from leases. The court held that LL&E was not entitled to any 
money for this claim because it had prescribed pursuant to Louisiana Civil 
Code Article 3494(5). Court also held that even if not prescribed, LL&E 
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Court then discussed reimbursements Unocal had received for gathering 
costs actually received by Unocal from its gas purchaser. According to the 
relevant provision of the joint operating agreement, the court found that the 
value of the gas sold was its selling price (including premiums or 
allowance). These gathering costs can be added to selling price, citing 
Section 110 of the Natural Gas Policy Act (15 U.S.C. 3320) and further 
such allowances are royalty bearing, citing Mesa OperatingPartnershipv. 
U.S. Departmentofthe Interior,931 F. 2d 318 (5th Cir. 1991), cert denied 
502 U.S. 1058, 112 S. Ct. 934, 117 L. Ed 2d 106 (1992). LL&E was 
entitled to the amount held in suspense by Unocal for these reimbursed 
gathering charges. These claims had not prescribed because of the 
operation of the doctrine of contra non valentem. 
K. Mineral Leases 
Mattie Connell Caskey, et al v. Kelley Oil Company, 
No. 30,278 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2/25/98); WL 78826*. 
Plaintiffs, owners of a tract of land in Webster parish, granted a 
mineral lease with respect to the subject property. Kelley Oil later acquired 
a partial interest in the lease. Kelley improved and used a road that crossed 
the plaintiffs tract to drill and operate a well on adjacent property not 
owned by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs objected to these improvements and 
sought injunctive relieve and damages against Kelley Oil. Kelley relied 
on 
provisions in the lease that arguably allowed the leasee to construct roads 
on property in connection with operations on any adjacent lands. The court 
held Kelley failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
construction of the road conferred any benefit upon the plaintiffs. 
In 
assessing Kelly's actions, the court ofappeal relied upon the duty ofmutual 
benefit as expressed in Mineral Code Article 122. The court of appeal 
reversed the trial court and rendered judgment granting plaintiffs the 
injunctive relief prayed for. 
L. Successions 
Succession ofRivers, 
No. 97-542 (La.App. 3d Cir.10/8/97); 702 So. 2d 910. 
Clarence Rivers died intestate on October 29, 1981, survived by ten 
children born oftwo different marriages. The decedent owned an interest 
in 
12 acres of land. The succession was judicially opened by the seven 
children of the second marriage in 1993, and the administratrix, 
a 
daughter 
of the second marriage, petitioned the court for authority to sell property to 
her brother. The petition was approved and the property sold, but the 
description of the property in the succession, included in the sworn 
descriptive list, described only one acre and not the entire twelve acre tract. 
This error in the description also appeared in the petition for authority to 
sell, the advertisements, the judgment authorizing the sale and the sale 
itself, even though the succession representative and the buyer apparently 
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intended to convey the entire tract. Suit was subsequently brought to 
reform the act of sale to include the entire property. The trial court 
reformed the deed. The court of appeal reversed, holding that reformation 
was not available because there was no mutual error or mistake. As to the 
seller (the succession), there was no error as the authorized sale was only 
for one acre. The intention of the succession representative was irrelevant, 
because the succession representative was not the seller. 
Succession of Eliza Laviolette, 
No. 9 7-885 (La.App. 3d Cir. 12/10/97); 704 So. 2d 339. 
Filing a request for Notice of Application for Appointment as 
Administrator does not constitute the "judicial opening" ofa succession for 
purposes of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2893. This article 
provides that no testament will be admitted to probate unless a petition 
therefor has been filed in a court ofcompetent jurisdiction within five years 
after the judicial opening of the succession of the deceased. La. R.S. 9:5643 
provides for a five year prescriptive period on the right to probate 
testaments, measured from judicial opening of succession. A judicial 
opening was distinguished from opening of succession as contemplated in 
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 934. To give meaning to 
Louisiana Code ofCivil Procedure Article 3091, the court determined that 
filing the request for notice can occur before or after succession is opened 
and as such does not judicially open succession. 
Succession ofBecker, 
No. 96-2169 (La.App. 4th Cir. 12/5/97); 704 So. 2d 825. 
Appeal from 
a 
judgment of the trial court requiring the widow of 
decedent to furnish security to the adult children and forced heirs of 
decedent. The children were from a previous marriage and not children of 
the widow and decedent. Decedent left these children his separate property 
which included an interest in a lease. The decedent's widow was granted 
a 
usufruct of the lease and the decedent directed in his will that the usufruct 
be without bond. The court concluded that the rights of forced heirs to 
compel the furnishing ofsecurity could not be derogated from by testament. 
However, the court then found that the rentals from a sublease on the lease 
interest were fruits of the usufruct of the lease and the forced heirs were not 
entitled to security for these rental payments. 
Succession ofReeves, 
97-20 (La.App. 3rd Cir.10/29/97); 704 So. 2d 252. 
Decedent died in 1992, with a statutory will that left approximately 
one-half of his estate to his second wife and the remaining one-half of his 
estate to nine of his ten children from a previous marriage. The child that 
was excluded from the will filed this lawsuit to annul his father's will 
alleging that the second wife exerted undue influence on the father. The 
trial court held that the decedent's second wife of eleven years had exerted 
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undue influence and nullified all bequests to her. The court of appeal held 
that the trial court erred in concluding that the second wife exerted undue 
influence over the testator and reversed. 
The trial court relied heavily on the opinion ofa forensic psychiatrist 
that supported a finding that the decedent was susceptible to undue 
influence. The psychiatrist never met the testator or his second wife and 
based his opinion on interviews with people who knew the decedent. The 
court observed that a surviving spouse ofeleven years was not the intended 
target of Louisiana Civil Code Article 1479 (voiding wills based on undue 
influence). The trial court relied upon the exploitation of decedent's sexual 
dependency, fear of abandonment and his need for companionship in 
finding undue influence. The court of appeal suggested that love, 
companionship and intimacy are the primary reasons for marriage and 
called these things the "marriage imperatives." As a result, the court 
specifically held that the granting or withholding of love, companionship 
and intimacy, "the marriage imperatives," are matters reserved to the 
married couple and shall not, standing alone, serve to invalidate a will. The 
court of appeal also put much weight on the testimony of those who actually 
knew the decedent rather than the psychiatrist who relied upon second-hand 
recollections. The psychiatrist's opinion was not enough to overcome the 
presumption of statutory capacity. 
Succession ofRoniger, 
No. 97-1088 (La.App. 4th Cir.1/14/98); WL 12535*. 
Decedent died on February 
1, 
1996 and on March 1, 1996 decedent's 
will dated December 12, 1996 was submitted for probate. Decedent's 
nephew filed a petition to annul the probated testament for failure to meet 
statutory requirements. Defendants filed an exception of no cause of action 
and trial court maintained the exception and found the testament to be 
authentic. Extrinsic evidence was allowed to clarify the date. There was 
one written dissent based on the fact that the case was before the court on an 
exception of no cause of action and for that reason no extrinsic evidence 
should have been considered. 
Succession ofHackney v. Russell, 
No. 9 7-859 (La.App. 3d Cir.
2/4/98); 
WL 40376*. 
Son of testator brought this action to contest the will. Trial court 
annulled the will and named son executor. Testatrix's third husband and 
testamentary executor appealed. Court of appeal considered the following 
bequests: 
"Second: Igive, devise and bequeath unto my husband, Paul Raymond 
Hackney, the disposable portion of my interest in and to the 
Community of Acquets and Gains which existed between us, subject to 
the right of usufruct of, my husband, Paul Raymond Hackney, until 
such time as he shall remarry or until his death..." 
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The court held these bequests did not cancel each other out, but 
concluded that testator intended to confer full ownership of disposable 
portion ofher interest in the community to her husband and the balance of 
her interest in the community property to her son, subject to the usufruct in 
favor of her husband. Court of appeal said that in seeking to resolve the 
ambiguity it was appropriate to consider the testimony of the notary who 
prepared the will and it was also appropriate to consider language contained 
in the husband's will executed on the same day the testatrix executed her 
will before the same notary. 
Succession ofHagelberger, 
No. 96-2049 (La.App. 4th Cir.8/27/97); 700 So. 2d 226. 
Decedent died without children and was never married and was 
predeceased by his parents. Issue in this case was meaning of term "heirs" 
in his olographic will. The will set forth specific legatees then left any 
residual "to be equally divided between my heirs." Court held this term 
indicated testator's intent to provide for those persons called by law to 
inherit from him. 
M. Tax sales -
Oliver v. Zeringue, 
No. 97-329 (La.App. 3d Cir.10/29/97); 702 So. 2d 1086. 
Plaintiff brought suit to quiet title to property acquired at a tax sale. 
According to stipulated facts, plaintiff acquired interests in property owned 
by the defendant, Zeringue, in two separate tax sales held in 1989 and 1990. 
It was stipulated that notices of the tax delinquency and the tax sales in 
1989 and 1990 were sent only to Louisiana Bank and Trust Company, 
a mortgage holder on the property, and that Zeringue did not receive any 
notice. The court of appeal held that notice sent to Zeringue in care of 
a 
bank was not reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and offer them an opportunity to present their 
objections. Accordingly, the tax sales were null. 
McChesney v. Penn, 
No. 29776 (La.App. 2d Cir.8/20/97); 698 So. 2d 705. 
Plaintiff held a mortgage covering lands subsequently sold at tax sale. 
Plaintiff brought suit to declare the tax sale a nullity on grounds that he was 
not provided notice of the sale. The defendant argued that plaintiff was not 
entitled to notice under La. R.S. 47:2180.1, which provides for notice to 
mortgage holders who have notified the tax assessor and also provides that 
no tax sale shall be set aside for lack of notice to a mortgagee. The court 
of 
appeal holds that under MennoniteBoardofMissions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 
791 (1983), 
if 
a mortgagee is not reasonably identifiable, constructive 
notice by publication of a tax sale satisfies due process requirements. The 
court held that the plaintiff was not reasonably identifiable in the mortgage 
and therefore constructive notice by publication was adequate. The 
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mortgage was made payable to any future holder and plaintiff was not 
identified anywhere in the document. Plaintiff argued that he was named in 
an assignment ofrents and leases on the subject property and this document 
was filed into the mortgage records directly behind the mortgage, but the 
mortgage itself did nothing to indicate the existence of the assignment of 
rents and leases. The court of appeal did not reach the constitutionality of 
La. R.S. 47:2180.1. See Murchisonsv. Marzullio, below. 
Murchisonsv. Martuio, 
No. 97-815 (La.App. 3d Cir. 12/10/97); 1997 WL 75804. 
Plaintiff brought suit to homologate his tax title. Trial judge dismissed 
petition to homologate annulling the tax sale and court ofappeal affirmed. 
Plaintiff purchased subject property at a tax sale in May, 1991. The original 
property owners defaulted on the mortgage in October 1993. The 
mortgagee proceeded to seize and sell the property by executory process. 
Plaintiff sued mortgagor, mortgagee and purchaser of property in 
foreclosure proceedings. In affirming trial court's decision, the court of 
appeal held that Louisiana's statutory request notice scheme alone does not 
satisfy due process requirements. The mortgagee failed to request notice 
under the Louisiana statutes, but this failure was not a waiver of it's due 
process rights. The court citing Mennonite stated that "a mortgagee's 
knowledge of delinquency in the payment of taxes is not equivalent to 
notice that a tax sale is pending...". Actual knowledge does not replace the 
Mennonite requirement of notice reasonably calculated to apprise a party 
with a legally protected property interest of a pending sale. The result 
is 
that Louisiana's notice request scheme is not constitutional. 
FederalDeposit Insurance Corporation, as receiver for New Orleans 
FederalSaving andLoan Association v. Harry Lee, 
96-31127 (5th Cir. 12/29/97); 130 F.3d 1139. 
In the 1980s, 1-12 passed near the corner of certain real estate located 
in Jefferson Parish. New Orleans Federal Savings and Loan held a 
mortgage on the property. New Orleans Federal was declared insolvent 
in 1986 and the FSLIC was appointed receiver and later replaced by the FDIC. 
The FSLIC filed a request to receive notice of foreclosure, but did not 
include in its request a request for notice of any tax sale. A tax sale 
occurred in 1991, and the buyer at the tax sale later inquired whether the 
FDIC was going to redeem. Apparently, the FDIC said no. More than three 
years after tax sale the FDIC filed a writ ofmandamus to compel the Sheriff 
to issue 
a 
redemption deed. The state court denied and dismissed the writ of 
mandamus. The FDIC then filed suit in federal district court to declare the 
tax sale null and void as a violation of the FDIC's constitutional due process 
right to notice before the sale. Trial court declared tax sale null and void for 
lack ofnotice. FDIC also argued on appeal that 12 U.S.C. 25(b)(2) requires 
their consent before proceeding with tax sale. The Fifth Circuit Court 
of 
Appeals decided the case on this statutory basis rather than a constitutional 
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due process basis, holding that the tax sale was null and void because the 
FDIC did not consent to sale. 
N. Mandatory Arbitration 
Sun Drilling Products Corporation v. Rayborn, 
No. 97-2112, (La. App. 4' Cir., 12/3/97); 703 So. 2d 818. 
Contract contained a mandatory arbitration clause subject to the 
Federal Arbitration Act. Contract alleged to have been entered as a result of 
"fraud in the inducement of a contact." The court held that a defense based 
on the invalidity of the contract (and the binding effect of the contract) is 
not subject to arbitration. Court was reluctant because ofpotential for abuse 
in avoiding arbitration clauses, but nevertheless held it is the policy of the 
state, as originally declared by George Engine, Co., Inc. v. Southern 
ShipbuildingCorp., 350 So. 2d 881 (La. 1977), that the question of fraud 
in 
the inducement should be resolved in court rather than through arbitration. 
Court also identified an apparent conflict between Ackel 
v. 
Ackel, 97-
70, (La. App. 5th Cir. 5/28/97); 696 So. 2d 140 and Freemanv. Minolta, 
29655, (La. App. 2nd Cir. 9/24/97); 699 So. 2d 1182. In Freeman the court 
took the position that only fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause 
could be decided by the courts. This was distinguished from fraud in the 
inducement of a contract generally. The Court in Ackel held that the 
presence of an arbitration clause in a contract did not divest the district 
court ofjurisdiction to determine the validity and legality of the underlying 
contract. 
TRCM, LLC v. The Twilight Partnership, 
No. 30,331 (La.App. 2d Cir.1/21/98); WL 18037*. 
TRCM alleged vices of consent in the inducement of its contract with 
the defendant. Defendant Twilight argued that the contract called for 
arbitration of this issue. The contract specifically required that the validity 
of the contract be settled by arbitration. The court of appeal initially 
affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration. On 
remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court, the court ofappeal enforced the 
arbitration provision, apparently relying on the specific contractual 
requirement that the validity of the contract be settled by arbitration. The 
court also followed the rule that arbitration provisions are enforced in this 
instance unless the arbitration provision itself is based upon fraud or 
misrepresentation. Compare with Sun DrillingProductsabove, indicating 
an apparent conflict among the circuits. 
0. Non-Competition Agreements 
Henderson Implement Co., Inc. 
v. 
Langley, 
9 7-1197 (La.App. 3d Cir.2/4/98); WL 
40373*. Action by plaintiff seeking a restraining order against Langley for 
solicitation of customers in violation of a non-competition agreement 
between the parties. Defendant Langley argued that agreement was null and 
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void because it sought to restrict his ability to compete with plaintiffs 
affiliates as well as plaintiff and because the agreement did not define the 
business ofplaintiff. Court of appeal affirmed the trial court's preliminary 
injunction of Langley holding that the contract limited the area of the non-
compete covenant to a single parish. Further, the court allowed a 
reformation of the non-compete provisions to exclude affiliates. 
Louisiana Smoked Products, Inc. v. 
Savoie's 
Sausage 
and Food Products, Inc., 
96-1716, 96-1727 (La. 7/1/97); 696 So. 2d 1373. 
The question in this case was whether a non-competition clause 
contained in a manufacturing and processing agreement was null and void 
under La. R.S. 23:921(A). In the contract, Savoie agreed to manufacture 
and process smoked alligator and smoked venison sausage. The contract, 
prepared by Savoie, contained a non-competition clause prohibiting the 
parties from engaging in activities which directly competed with the other 
party's business activity for a period of three years after termination of the 
agreement. After termination of the agreement, the plaintiff claimed Savoie 
breached the non-competition clause and filed this suit. The Supreme Court 
held La. R.S. 23:921 was inapplicable to this situation as it was not intended 
to protect independent corporations on equal footing. 
P. Zoning 
Parish ofSt. Charles 
v. 
Grimaldi Corp., 
No. 96-663 (La. App. 5th Cir. 5/28/97); 696 So. 2d 161. 
Parish brought an action to enjoin the defendant from using property 
zoned for residential purposes to operate a business engaged in storing 
abandoned, junked, wrecked and derelict vehicles. The defendant 
contended that the two year prescriptive period established under La. R.S. 
9:5625(A) was applicable. The court of appeal holds that the two year 
prescriptive statute for zoning use violations, as amended in 1972, does not 
begin to run until the appropriate governmental agency is notified in writing 
of the violation. 
Q. Other 
Plaquemines Parish Comm. Council 
v. 
Delta Dev. Co., 
No. 96-0270 (La. App. 4th Cir.1/29/97); 688 So. 2d 169, writ denied. 
Two levee boards, the predecessors to the parish council, granted oil 
and gas leases to Delta Development Company. Delta Development 
Company granted subleases to Gulf Refining Company, reserving 
overriding royalty interests. The parish contended that Leander Perez, Sr.,
the parish district attorney, had a conflict of interest and breached his 
fiduciary duties to the levee boards in connection with his acquisition of 
those overriding royalty interests. The court of appeal affirmed the trial 
court's judgment that the overriding royalty interests were obtained through 
a breach of fiduciary duty by Perez and that Perez's grandson, who acquired 
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his interest as an heir or donee, was required to account for all sums 
received attributable to those interests. 
Lafayette Parish School Board, Sales Tax Division v. State of 
Louisiana, through The Department ofRevenue and Taxation, 
97-519 (La.App. 3d Cir.10/29/97); 701 So. 2d 734. 
Held that La. R.S. 47:301(3)(d), enacted by Acts 1990, No. 719, 1990 
applies prospectively only. This statute deals with election ofan alternative 
method ofcomputing the use tax on measurement while drilling systems. 
St Charles Mortgage 
& 
Loan, Inc. v. Oubre, 
97-371 (La.App. 5th Cir. 10/15/9 7); 701 So. 2d 1020. 
St. Charles Mortgage sought the reinscription ofa mortgage which was 
executed on April 23, 1985. St. Charles reinscribed the mortgage on 
October 30, 1995 and the reinscription was cancelled by the Clerk ofCourt 
on December 12, 1996 as untimely. The court held that in accordance with 
La. R.S. 9:5161, the cancellation of the untimely reinscription was proper, 
but clarified that the mortgage was still effective as between the contracting 
parties. 
Sudwischer v. Hoffpauir, 
97-0785, (La. 12/12/97); WL 771216. Rehearing denied.* 
In this action to establish filiation, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
considered whether Louisiana Civil Code Article 209 is procedural or 
substantive. Louisiana Civil Code Article 209 establishes the burden of 
proof in filiation cases. The court held the article was procedural and thus 
retroactive. 
Property Asset Management, Inc. v. Pirogue Cove Apartments, 
97-0212 (La.App. 4th Cir.4/11/97); 693 So. 2d 1217. 
This case involved a suit to enforce a defaulted in rem mortgage by 
ordinary proceedings. The court ofappeal reversed the trial court's ruling 
that in rem proceedings can only be brought against nonresidents. The 
court confirmed that a mortgage is a real right and that an action to enforce 
a mortgage is, in all cases, an in rem action. The court reiterated that both 
ordinary and executory proceedings are in rem proceedings available to 
enforce a mortgage. 
II. Legislation 
A. Acts 1997, No. 208 - Office of Conservation hearings 
-Provides that the commissioner of conservation shall implement 
monthly public hearings in Shreveport, provided that funds for such 
meetings are appropriated by the legislature. 
-
Money to fund these meetings were appropriated in Acts 1997, 
* Please note that these opinions have not been released for publication in the permanent law 
reports and until released, are subject to revision or withdrawal. 
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No. 18. 
B. Acts 1997, No. 230 - Effect of work or compliance orders 
-Amended La. R.S. 30:27 to provide that a work order or a 
compliance order issued by the commissioner of conservation shall be 
sufficient authority for the operator or persons acting on his behalf to 
enter upon lands of another person, whether or not leased by the 
operator, for purposes ofconducting site assessments, site restoration, 
pit closure, plugging and abandonment operations, or other matters 
covered by the work order. 
-
Written notice provisions are included. 
C. Acts 1997, No. 257 - Conflict of laws -Forced Heirship 
- Amendment of La. Civil Code Article 3533 providing that the 
forced heirship law does, not apply if the deceased was domiciled 
outside the state at the time of death and he left no forced heirs 
domiciled in the state at the time of his death. 
D. Acts 1997, No. 261 - Mandate 
- Comprehensive revision of Louisiana Civil Code Articles 2985 
through 3032 relating to mandate. 
E. Acts 1997, No. 530 
-
State Mineral Board 
-Amendment of La. R.S. 30:209 provides that the State Mineral 
Board shall have the authority to enter into operating agreements 
in various circumstances, including when title is disputed. Act ratifies 
operating agreements previously entered by the State Mineral Board. 
F. Acts 1997, No. 584 - Tax sale notice 
- Repeals La. R.S. 9:5201, 5202 and 5203 which permitted any 
person holding a mortgage to file a request for notice of each and 
every tax sale and liability of the clerk for failure to comply. 
G. Acts 1997, No. 818 
-
Inheritance and Estate Transfer Taxes 
-Amendment of La. R.S. 47:2401, 2431 and 2432(A) and 
enactment ofLa. R.S. 47:2403(E) and 2420(D) providing, among other 
things, that no inheritance tax shall be due for deaths occurring after 
June 30, 2004 when judgment ofpossession is rendered or succession 
is judicially opened within nine months after death. Also provides for 
reductions in the rates of tax each year until 2004. 
H. Acts 1997, No. 993 - Sheriffs sale -Notice to Commissioner 
- Provides that prior to any sheriff s sale or public auction of "any 
property related to the operation of oil and gas wells," the person 
seeking such sale shall notify the commissioner of conservation of the 
sale not less than 30 days prior to such sale. The sale shall not occur 
unless the commissioner consents thereto in writing. Further provides 
for a lien in favor of the commissioner and that the failure to provide 
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notice renders the person seeking the sale and the purchaser liable to 
the office of conservation for the fair market value of the property at 
the time of the seizure and sale. 
- This act amends and reenacts La. R.S. 30:74(A)(30 and enacts La. 
R.S. 30:74(a)(4). 
I. Acts 1997, No. 1040 
-
Oil, Gas and Water Well Privileges 
-Amends oil and gas well privilege act (La. R.S. 9:4881 through 
9:4889) to provide operators a privilege over the property of non-
operators to secure payment ofobligations incurred in the conduct of 
operations which the non-operator is personally bound to pay or 
reimburse. 
-
Also provides the non-operator with a privilege over the property 
of the operator to secure payment of all obligations owed by the 
operator from the sale or other disposition ofhydrocarbons of the non-
operator produced from the well. 
J. Acts 1997, No. 1118 
-
Child Support Privilege and Mortgage 
-Provides for effect of award for past due child support. Also 
provides that an affidavit filed by the Department of Social Services 
shall have the effect of a judgment which shall operate as a first lien, 
privilege and legal mortgage on all movable (excluding motor 
vehicles) and immovable property of the obligee from the date of 
filing. 
-
Amends and reenacts La. R.S. 13:4291 and enacts La. R.S. 
46:236.10. 
K. Acts 1997, No. 1421 - Successions 




L. Acts 1997, No. 1474 - Filing fees 
- Enactment of La. R.S. 9:5217 provides for uniform filing fees 
charged for recording multiple indebtedness mortgage executed under 
Louisiana Civil Code Article 3298. 
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